This book presents a strong case for substance dualism and offers a comprehensive defence of the knowledge argument, showing that materialism cannot accommodate or explain the 'hard problem' of consciousness. Bringing together the discussion of reductionism and semantic vagueness in an original and illuminating way, Howard Robinson argues that non-fundamental levels of ontology are best treated by a conceptualist account, rather than a realist one. In addition to discussing the standard versions of physicalism, he examines physicalist theories such as those of McDowell and Price, and accounts of neutral monism and panpsychism from Strawson, McGinn and Stoljar. He also explores previously unnoticed historical parallels between Frege and Aristotle and between Hume and Plotinus. His book will be a valuable resource for scholars and advanced students of philosophy of mind, in particular those looking at consciousness, dualism and the mind-body problem.
Contents
Preface page xi Acknowledgements xiii Armstrong still remain the best that standard physicalism can achieve. This book divides into three parts. In Part I, I argue against all the main attacks that have been made on the knowledge argument, but, beyond that, I argue that the knowledge argument does not merely resist all attempts to refute it, but that it has much more powerful consequences than is usually allowed for by either side in the discussion. What it shows is that the qualitative dimension of reality, without which the world can be nothing more than a bare formal system, is something that standard physicalism cannot accommodate. If the knowledge argument were not correct, there could be no manifest image of the world at all, and without the manifest image, there could be no scientific image either. I also try to prove the inadequacy of various non-reductive naturalist strategies, such as neutral monism and those that derive from the work of Wittgenstein and Donald Davidson.
In Part II, I challenge one of the main motivations of physicalism. The physicalist believes in the closure of the physical world. It is a consequence of this that if the mental is not physical, it must be epiphenomenal. I try to show that if the world is closed under physics -that is the physical world's most fundamental and microscopic level -then all higher levels, which must include the brain/mind if physicalism is true, will be epiphenomenal: I defend, that is, a version of what Kim calls the exclusion principle, and I do this via an investigation of reductionism and semantic vagueness. I carry the conclusion further and argue that there are no strict physical individuals at all: at most there are quality placings in space-time, presumably as the features of events. In Part III, I try to prove that we must be simple immaterial selves, and as such, minds are the only true individuals in the natural world. In the final chapter I tie this thought up to themes in the history of philosophy. I argue that a doctrine universally ignored by analytical philosophers, namely Plotinus's doctrine of the One, can be used to throw welcome light on the notion of an individual and on modern debates concerning the unity of substances. In fact, the notion of individuality that we project on the world has its source in our own identity as individuals. In this way, Plotinus's metaphysics and Humean conventionalism are both true. In the process, I draw attention to a striking -and, as far as I know, unnoticed -parallel between Frege's treatment of concepts and Aristotle's criticism of Plato's theory of forms, and how this supports a form of neo-Platonism.
If some of my conclusions run against current fashion in a way that provokes resistance, I believe that my arguments on particular issues follow all the normal canons of analytic carefulness and fall well within the framework of contemporary debates. I therefore ask the reader who finds parts of the final outcome rebarbative to try to take seriously the contributions to individual discussions that happen on the way. 
